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There exists in the United States a well-established doctrine
which prohibits judicial examination of certain actions of foreign
sovereigns done within their own territory. A recent decision of the
United States Supreme Court, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Re-

public of Cuba,1 may represent a step toward erosion of this deferential act of state rule at least insofar as it protects the foreign
nation which acts as a commercial trader. In Dunhill, four of the
nine Justices of the Supreme Court recognized that "purely commercial" acts of nations are not protected by the act of state doctrine, while the remaining five Justices found it unnecessary to
consider a commercial exception to the act of state rule.
This Article will discuss the views expressed by the Justices of
the Supreme Court in the Dunhill case. In order to fully understand those views and to appreciate the import and ramifications of
a commercial exception to the act of state doctrine, it is helpful to
examine the background of the Dunhill controversy.
THE Dunhill CONTROVERSY

On September 15, 1960, pursuant to its own Decree, the
Cuban Government seized the business and assets of five leading
cigar manufacturers and appointed agents of the Government,
called interventors, to operate the businesses. The Cuban owners
of the businesses fled to the United States. For several months
t The authors of this Article were counsel of record to Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc.
* A.B., Harvard University, 1954; LL.B., Yale Law School, 1957.
** B.A., Middlebury College, 1969; J.D., Columbia University, 1972.
1 96 S. Ct. 1854 (1976).
2 "Intervention" is distinguishable in theory from the related concept of confiscation.
Under the law of the Castro regime, title to an intervened Cuban business remains in the
hands of its former owners. However, the business is operated for the benefit of the Cuban
Government to the exclusion of its former owners and officers. The former owners have no
rights to profits. See Law No. 647 of Nov. 24, 1959, as amended, Law No. 843 ofJune 30, 1960
[1960] Folletos de Divilgacion Legislativa (Cuba). In Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc.,
345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d
Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 96 S. Ct. 1854
(1976), the subject litigation of this Article, the district court treated intervention as complete
confiscation "in practical effect." 345 F. Supp. at 532.
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thereafter, three principal importers of cigars, including Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc., continued to do business with the companies, paying for cigars shipped before the Decree and ordering
new shipments. In February 1961, however, the former owners
asserted that they, and not the interventors, were entitled to payment for the shipments and to enforce their claim, each of the
former owners instituted separate actions against the importers
which were eventually consolidated for trial in Menendez v. Faber,
Coe & Gregg, Inc.3 In response, Cuba and the interventors promptly
took action in F. Palicio y Compania S.A. v. Brush4 against the attorneys of the former owners, seeking to enjoin the latter's lawsuit and
to establish the right of the interventors to payment for the cigars.
The issue of who was entitled to payment for the postintervention shipments, as it was presented in Palicio, was resolved by the
Supreme Court's decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.5 In
Sabbatino, the Court held that the legality of a Cuban expropriation
decree, even if discriminatory, retaliatory, and arguably in violation
of international law, cannot be reviewed in the United States.6
3 345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355
(2d Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 96 S. Ct.
1854 (1976). The nine separate actions that were consolidated for trial were Menendez v.
Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., Civil No. 61-472 (S.D.N.Y.); Por Larranaga, Fabrica de Tabacos,
S.A. v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., Civil No. 61-582 (S.D.N.Y.); Cifuentes v. Faber, Coe &
Gregg, Inc., Civil No. 61-583 (S.D.N.Y.); F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Faber, Coe & Gregg,
Inc., Civil No. 61-584 (S.D.N.Y.); Cifuentes v. Dunhill Intl, Inc., Civil No. 61-848 (S.D.N.Y.);
Menendez v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., Civil No. 61-849 (S.D.N.Y.); Por Larranaga, Fabrica de
Tabacos, S.A. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., Civil No. 61-850 (S.D.N.Y.); F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v.
Dunhill Int'l, Inc., Civil No. 61-869 (S.D.N.Y.); Menendez v. Saks & Co., Civil No. 61-3336
(S.D.N.Y.).
" 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), af'd per curiam, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 830 (1967). The Menendez litigation was held in abeyance by the district court
pending determination of the parties' rights in Palicio. 345 F. Supp. at 532.
5 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
6 A determination of the legality of a sovereign's act typically depends upon the resolution
of a conflict of laws issue. An American victim of a Cuban expropriation, for example, may
argue that international law, rather than Cuban law, governs the question of the legality of the
expropriation. However, the Sabbatino Court ruled that a determination of the conflict of laws
issue could create numerous problems: it could embarrass the executive branch, interfere with
foreign relations, disrupt the constitutional allocation of governmental powers, involve a
political question, or impede the flow of international trade. Id. at 431-34. Thus, the Sabbatino
Court forbade adjudication of the legality of a Cuban expropriation decree.
The victims of the September 15, 1960 Decree at issue inPalicio were all Cubans and were
precluded at the outset from raising an international conflict of laws issue since a citizen
cannot hold his own state to standards of international law when the act of which he complains
is lawful in his own country. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 442
(1964) (White, J., dissenting); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 332 (1937); Pons v.
Republic of Cuba, 294 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 960 (1962); Luther v.

James Sagor & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 532; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES §§ 165, 171 (1965); Zander, The Act of StateDoctrine, 53 AM.J. INT'L L. 826
(1959). It should be noted that theSabbatinodecision may permit adjudication of the legality of
a foreign act of state if the alleged crimes committed by a sovereign infringe upon basic
human rights. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 457 n.18 (1964);
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Under the act of state doctrine 7 as enunciated in Sabbatino, the
courts of this country are obliged to give full legal effect to all
foreign expropriation decrees insofar as they affect property
within the foreign state. 8 Applying this rule, the Palicio district
court held that the interventors and not the former owners were
entitled to payment for cigars shipped after the Decree. 9
Thus, the Palicio court resolved in favor of Cuba the issue of
entitlement to payment for postintervention shipments by application
of the act of state rule. However, the former owners remained
party to the Menendez litigation' in part because Cuba had agreed
in Palicio to allow the former owners alone to prosecute claims for
the "small sum" owed by the importers for preintervention shipments."
At the Menendez trial, it became apparent that the "small sum"
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 165, comment b

at 502 (1965). For general discussion of the Sabbatino doctrine, see Falk, The Complexity of
Sabbatino, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 935 (1964); Friedmann, NationalCourts and the InternationalLegal
Order: Projections on the hnplications of the Sabbatino Case, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443, 447-55
(1966); Lillich, A PyrrhicVictory at Foley Square: The Second Circuitand Sabbatino, 8 VILL. L. REv.
155 (1963); Mann, The Legal Consequences of Sabbatino, 51 VA. L. REV. 604 (1965); Stevenson,
The Sabbatino Case-ThreeSteps Forwardand Two Steps Back, 57 ANI. J. INT'L L. 97 (1963); Note,
The Castro Government in American Courts: Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine, 75
HARV. L. REV. 1607, 1614-18 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Note].
7 The act of state doctrine was initially advanced in this country in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897) (dictum), wherein the Supreme Court stated: "Every sovereign State
is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one
country will not sit injudgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own
territory." Id. at 252. Adherence to the doctrine was subsequently reiterated in Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) and Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304
(1918). For a general discussion of the act of state doctrine, see Katzenbach, Conflicts on an
Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and InternationalLaw, 65 YALE L.J.
1087, 1151-56 (1956); Zander, The Act ofState Doctrine, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 826 (1959); Harvard
Note, supra note 6, at 1608-10, 1614-18.
8 376 U.S. at 428. See Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966), discussed in text accompanying notes 17-20 infra; Compania
Ron Bacardi S.A. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 193 F. Supp. 814, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Naamloze
Vennootschap Suikerfabriek "Wono-Aseh" v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 111 F. Supp. 833, 841
(S.D.N.Y. 1953); Zwack v. Kraus Bros. & Co., 93 F. Supp. 963, 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), affd, 237
F.2d 255, 259 (2d Cir. 1956).
9 256 F. Supp. at 488-89.
10See text accompanying note 3 supra.
" 256 F. Supp. at 489 n.8. Although the Palicio district court referred to Cuba's agreement to "turn over to the [former owners] the small sum" representing amounts due for
preintervention shipments, in the agreement incorporated in the Paliciojudgment, the interventors agreed not to press their claims for these sums. F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush,
Civil No. 61-2299 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 31, 1966).
It should be noted that the former owners' primary reason for remaining a party to the
Menendez litigation was to press claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition
against the importers and the interventors. In fact, since it was thought by all parties that the
preintervention debts were negligible, the owners might well have abandoned the Menendez
litigation entirely had not the trademark claims been involved. Ultimately, the Menendez court
rejected the owners' demands for injunctive relief since the United States embargo against
Cuban goods eliminated the possibility of any future violation of the former owners'
trademark rights. 345 F. Supp. at 559-60.
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representing preintervention debts was not small at all. The practice of the importers had been to pay for merchandise between 30
and 90 days after shipment. Consequently, the amount owed by
Dunhill for preintervention shipments actually exceeded the
amount due for cigars shipped after the Decree. On the date of the
Decree, Dunhill's obligations amounted to approximately $148,600,
while the value of all shipments to Dunhill after that date was only
about $93,000.12 Since Cuba had relinquished its claim to the
preintervention debts on the assumption that they were minimal,
the Menendez court allowed the parties to litigate the issue of entitlement to payments for the preintervention shipments. 13
The Menendez court refused to give effect under the act of
state doctrine to the expropriation decree insofar as it purported to
seize the former owners' accounts receivable. Since the act of state
doctrine applies only with respect to property within the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign, the key issue before the court was the
situs of the accounts receivable. 14 Applying the rule of Harris v.
Balk,'15 the court found that the importers' debts constituted property of the former owners located in the United States. 6 In Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank 17 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit had held that "when property confiscated is within
the United States at the time of the attempted confiscation, our
courts will give effect to acts of state 'only if they are consistent with
the policy and law of the United States.'" 18 Since it was clear to the
Menendez court that confiscation without compensation is contrary
to the law of this country, the Decree was held ineffective insofar as
it purported to confiscate the former owners' accounts receivable.' 9
Accordingly, the former owners were held entitled to these1
2
sums 20 - sums which, however, had already been paid to Cuba.
The trial court further ruled that the importers' payments to Cuba
did not discharge their obligations to the former owners.2 2 Under
12 345 F. Supp. at 564.

1 Id. at 533-34.
14Id. at 537.
15 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
16

345 F. Supp. at 538.

353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
18353 F.2d at 51 (citation omitted).
19 345 F. Supp. at 537-38.
20
Id. at 540, 542.
21 The interventors, whose records were not in good order, claimed that they did not
know whether they had received payment for the preintervention shipments. Id. at 536. The
Menendez district court determined that the interventors had, in fact, received such payments.
Id. The interventors contended on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support the
trial court's finding regarding their receipt of preintervention payments. 485 F.2d at 1363.
The court of appeals rejected this contention. Id. at 1369.
22 345 F. Supp. at 542.
17
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the theory of unjust enrichment, however, the importers were al23
lowed to recover these payments from Cuba by way of setoff
against amounts the Palicio court had held were due Cuba for
postintervention shipments.2 4 Since the amounts paid by Dunhill to
Cuba for preintervention shipments exceeded the amounts Dunhill
owed Cuba for postintervention shipments, 25 the Menendez court
awarded an affirmative judgment in favor of Dunhill for the difference.2 6
One argument raised by the interventors in support of their
claim to keep the preintervention payments they had received was
based on the Sabbatino doctrine. 2 7 The interventors contended that
Cuba's failure or refusal to return the preintervention payments to
the importers constituted an act of state, and thus Sabbatino barred
the importers' recovery by way of a setoff or otherwise for amounts
mistakenly paid to Cuba. 28 The Menendez court rejected this argument, stating:
[I]t may be noted that there was no formal repudiation of these
obligations by Cuban Government decree of general application
or otherwise....
Here, all that occurred was a statement by counsel for the
interventors, during trial, that the Cuban Government and the
interventors denied liability and had refused to make repayment.
This statement was made after the interventors had invoked the
jurisdiction of this Court in order to pursue their claims against
the importers for post-intervention shipments. It is hard to conceive how, if such a statement can be elevated to the status of an
act of state, any refusal by any state to honor
any obligation at any
29
time could be considered anything else.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit set aside the
affirmative judgment in Dunhill's favor ° Rejecting the district
court's view that there was insufficient proof of an act of state, the
Second Circuit stated:
We .

.

. find ourselves unable to accept the district court's view

that because the Cuban government's repudiation of its obligation to return the funds to the importers was informal, taking the
form of a failure to honor the importers' demand (which was
Id. at 563-64.
24 See text accompanying notes 4-9 supra.
25 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
26 345 F. Supp. at 563-64.
27 For a discussion of Sabbatino, see notes 6-8 and accompanying text supra.
28 345 F. Supp. at 544.
29
Id. at 545.
30 Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1374 (2d. Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 96 S. Ct. 1854 (1976).
23
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confirmed by the Cuban government's counsel at trial), it fails to
qualify as an act of state. The test is not whether the act was
embodied in a 'formal ...

decree of general application,' which

the district court deemed essential, but whether the agent acted
within the scope of his authority as a representative of the
foreign government. 31
Nevertheless, the court of appeals did not entirely set aside the
judgments awarded the importers against Cuba. 32 This disposition
by the Second Circuit was based upon First National City Bank v.
Banco Nacionalde Cuba (Citibank),33 which the Menendez court interpreted to hold that in a lawsuit instituted by a foreign sovereign the
act of state doctrine does not preclude adjudication of a counterclaim based upon an illegal act of state. 34 However, according to
the Menendez panel, Citibank limits recovery on any such counterclaim to the amount sought by the foreign government. 35 Thus
the court of appeals affirmed the judgments allowing setoff claims
by the importers 36 but reversed the affirmative judgment entered
37
in favor of Dunhill.
Dunhill then petitioned for certiorari, urging that the remarks
of Cuba's counsel failed to prove an act of state. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, and set the case down for argument, directing the parties to address the question of whether the statements of Cuba's counsel that the interventors would not honor
Dunhill's claim for return of the payments constituted an act of
state. 38 Five months after this question had been briefed and argued, the Supreme Court raised for reargument an unexpected
question: Should Sabbatino be reconsidered?3 9
Dunhill addressed this latter question by arguing that Sabbatino
should not preclude adjudication of a sovereign's repudiation of its
commercial obligations. 40 Dunhill contended that a sovereign state
which incurs liabilities in international trade does so not as a
3' 485 F.2d at 1371 (citation omitted).
32
1d. at 1373-74.
33 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
3 485 F.2d at 1373-74.
35 Id. For an interesting discussion of the Citibank case, see Leigh, The Supreme Court and

the Sabbatino Watchers: First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 13 VA.J. INT'L L. 33
(1972).
36 485 F.2d at 1374. See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
:1 485 F.2d at 1374.
38 416 U.S. 981 (1974). In addition, the parties were directed to brief a second issue: "[If
the statements of Cuba's counsel constitute an act of state], is an exception to the act of state
doctrine created ... where petitioner's counterclaim does not exceed the net balance owed to
Cuba on its claims by petitioner's co-defendants, and where all claims and counterclaims
arise out of the subject matter in litigation in this case?" Id. (citation omitted).
39 422 U.S. 1005 (1975).
40

Brief for Petitioner on Reargument at 8-18.
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sovereign, but as a merchant. Characterizing its claims as arising
out of its commercial dealings with Cuba, Dunhill argued that even
if Cuba's repudiation of its obligations was considered an act of
state, that repudiation should not preclude full adjudication of the
controversy. To the extent that Sabbatino precludes such adjudica4
tion, Dunhill urged that it be reconsidered. 1
The United States Solicitor General, appearing as amicus
curiae on reargument, took a position similar to Dunhill's. The
Solicitor General, like petitioner Dunhill, advanced an argument
predicated upon the so-called "restrictive theory of sovereign immunity." 42 In general, the doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibits judicial exercise of jurisdiction over foreign states or their property. 43 The restrictive theory recognizes sovereign immunity "only
with respect to causes of action arising out of a foreign state's
governmental acts (jure imperii) and not with respect to those arising out of its commercial or proprietary acts (jure gestionis)." 41
Quoting extensively from a 1952 letter in which the State Department first espoused this theory, 45 the Solicitor General and Dunhill
noted that a restrictive view of the sovereign immunity doctrine has
been adopted by lower courts in this country. 4 6 Thus, the Solicitor
General argued:
Under modern precepts of sovereign immunity a foreign state
may not assert mere sovereignty as a preclusive defense against a
claim or counterclaim relating to a commercial obligation.
But to defer to a foreign state's sovereignty by refusing to

enter judgment against it in an action on a commercial obligation
merely because of that state's repudiation of the obligation would
'lid. at 8.
42 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 18-27; Brief for Petitioner on Reargument at 10, 14.
" See generally Harvard Note, supra note 6, at 1607-08, 1610-14. The adoption of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity in this country dates back to at least the early 19th century.
See Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
41 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 20. See Brief for Petitioner on Reargument at 10, 14. Because of the increased importance of international trade, a trend
toward this restrictive view of the sovereign immunity doctrine has emerged in recent decades. See, e.g., National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955); Republic of
Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952) (the "Tate
Letter"), discussed in note 70 infra. This restrictive view is now generally favored by the lower
federal and state courts. See, e.g., Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966); Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336
F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965), discussed in note 51 infra; Premier
S.S. Corp. v. Embassy of Algeria, 336 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Ocean Transp. Co. v.
Republic of Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1967); Et Ve Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S.
Int'l Sales Corp., 25 Misc. 2d 299, 204 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1960).
"' The "Tate Letter," 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952), quoted in Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 96 S. Ct. 1854, 1869-71 (1976), discussed in note 70 infra.
4' Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 22; Brief for Petitioner on Reargument at
10. See note 44 supra.
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be to permit the state to assert mere sovereignty as a preclusive
defense. Therefore, a foreign state's repudiation of a commercial
preclude entry of judgment in favor of the
obligation does not
47
private claimant.

In addition, both the Solicitor General and Dunhill contended
that adoption and application of the restrictive theory would not
offend the sovereignty of a foreign nation since a state's
sovereignty as such is not involved in adjudication of a commercial
claim against it.4 s Immunity would be denied only because the
foreign state has appeared in the marketplace as a merchant and is
seeking to avoid its commercial obligations. 4 9 Applying this theory
to Dunhill's claim against the interventors, the Solicitor General
stated:
Petitioner's cause of action is based upon acts committed by respondents in their commercial capacities as sellers of tobacco
products: petitioner had paid respondents, in their roles as tobacco merchants, amounts in excess of petitioner's actual indebtedness for tobacco purchases; petitioner's counterclaim simply
seeks recovery of its excess payments.50
The Solicitor General viewed Cuba's contention that an act of
state had occurred upon repudiation of any obligation to Dunhill
as "nothing more . . . than a claim of sovereign immunity in disguise . . . an effort to resurrect the doctrine of absolute foreign
sovereign immunity under cover of the act of state doctrine." 51 In
47 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 17.
4
'id. at 24; see Brief for Petitioner on Reargument at 11.
49 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 24; Brief for Petitioner on Reargument at
10-11.
50 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 25.
51
d. at 26. Petitioner Dunhill advanced a similar argument:
Clearly, where a foreign sovereign has breached its commercial obligations ... the
rights of the parties in United States courts should not depend on whether the
sovereign pleads that it has repudiated its obligations as an act of state or whether it
pleads that it has not consented to be sued.
Brief for Petitioner on Reargument at 14 (citation omitted).
The Solicitor General also argued that an act of state must consist of a public act, which
involves the interest of a sovereign as a sovereign rather than as an entrepreneur. The
Solicitor General relied in part on Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965), in reaching the conclusion that an act of state
occurs only when a sovereign engages in a public act. In that case, the owner of a ship sued
the Spanish Government for damage sustained by his ship while it was docked in a Spanish
port. The ship had been chartered by the Spanish Government to carry wheat to ports
designated "safe" by the Spanish Government. The shipowner claimed that the ports were
not, in fact, safe. The Spanish Government contended that the act of state doctrine precluded inquiry into the propriety of its designation of safe ports. The Second Circuit
responded:
[A]ppellant, [a branch of the Spanish Government] seeks to enter the sanctuary of
sovereign immunity through the side door by urging that since the acts complained
of occurred in Spanish ports, which were designated as safe by a branch of the
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conclusion, it was urged that a foreign sovereign's liabilities in
commerce could be determined under established legal standards
applicable to private entrepreneurs, and that adjudication of such
liabilities would not embarrass the United States in its conduct of
international affairs.5 2 Thus, there was not present in the Dunhill
case, two considerations which intensified the Sabbatino Court's reluctance to adjudicate the legality of a sovereign's act - uncertainty
as to principles of international law acceptable to all nations and
possible embarrassment in the conduct of foreign affairs.53
Consequently, neither the Solicitor General nor Dunhill found
it necessary to reach the broader question of whether Sabbatino
should be reconsidered in toto. However, appended to the Solicitor
General's brief was a letter from the legal advisor of the Department of State.5 4 The legal advisor's letter reviewed a trend in the
executive branch favoring adjudication of acts of state, 55 noted several recent decisions in other countries favoring such adjudicaSpanish Government, the act of state doctrine prohibits holding the Spanish Government to account for the propriety of those acts. As most recently formulated by
the Supreme Court, the act of state doctrine precludes the courts of this country
from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign
power committed within its own territory. The difficulty with appellant's argument
is threefold. First of all, the act of state doctrine applies only to the "public acts" of a
foreign sovereign, and we cannot see that designating ports as safe for the S.S.
Hudson was a public act of the Spanish Government. The designation of safe ports
for the discharge of cargo is an act frequently performed by merchants voyagechartering a cargo ship. It can hardly be termed an act of state simply because a
state instrumentality happened to be the voyage-charterer. Moreover, designation
of the ports as safe was not an act performed within the territory of Spain, nor was
it performed by the Government of Spain. Here the designation of the actual
discharge ports was done on the bill of lading by the appellant's shipper at Mobile,
Alabama. Appellant's act of state argument is therefore considerably wide of the
mark.
336 F.2d at 362-63 (citations omitted).
52 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 36-37, 39; Brief for Petitioner on
Reargument at 11, 14.
53 A primary consideration behind the act of state doctrine has always been judicial
reluctance to interfere with executive foreign policy. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 433 (1964); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); Falk, The
Complexity of Sabbatino, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 935, 940, 943 (1964).
The Solicitor General also contended that any Cuban act of state committed against
Dunhill did not take place in Cuba, but in the United States. The Solicitor General wrote:
"Respondents' repudiation was intended to operate not within Cuba's territorial sovereignty
but within the United States, by 'confiscating' a United States national's cause of action that
was subject to adjudication in American courts under American law." Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 34-35 (footnote omitted).
54 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 45, quoted in Alfred Dunhill of London,
Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 96 S. Ct. 1854, 1867-69 (1976).
" The legal advisor's letter discussed three cases in which the executive branch had
expressed opposition to the act of state doctrine: First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972), discussed in text accompanying notes 33-35 supra; Bernstein v.
N.V. Nederlandsche Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (involving Nazi decrees);
and Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 272 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 383 F.2d 166
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968) (expropriation of a cargo of sugar by the
Castro government). Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 46-47.
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tions, 56 and all but urged complete abandonment of the act of state
doctrine:
In general this Department's experience provides little support
for a presumption that adjudication of acts of foreign states in
accordance with relevant principles of international law would
embarrass the conduct of foreign policy. Thus, it is our view that
if the Court should decide to overrule the holding in Sabbatino so
that acts of state would thereafter be subject to adjudication in
American courts under international law, we would not anticito the conduct of the foreign policy of the
pate embarrassment
57
United States.

On May 24, 1976, the Supreme Court, with four Justices dissenting, reversed the determination of the court of appeals and
reinstated the affirmative judgment in favor of Dunhill. 58 The
opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice White and was joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Powell, 59 and
was partially concurred in by Justice Stevens. The affirmative
judgment in Dunhill's favor was sustained on two alternative
grounds: First, a majority of the Court found insufficient proof of
an act of state by Cuba; and, second, Justices White, Rehnquist,
and Powell, and the Chief Justice agreed that even if there had
been an act of state, the act of state doctrine does not encompass
the repudiation of a "purely commercial obligation owed by a
foreign sovereign or by one of its commercial instrumentalities. 60
Justice White's opinion began by noting that both the district
court and the court of appeals found the September 15, 1960 Decree to be ineffective insofar as it purported to seize the importers'
accounts receivable. 61 Thus, it was reasoned, the interventors, in
order to escape repayment by utilization of the act of state doctrine, had to demonstrate "a second and later act of state involving
'1 The cases cited by the State Department are described in Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae at 47 n.2, 48 n.3.
57 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 49.
58 96 S. Ct. 1854 (1976).
59Justice Powell also wrote a brief concurring opinion. Id. at 1871 (Powell, J., concurring). He had expressed his views on the act of state doctrine for the first time as a member
of the Supreme Court in First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 773
(1972) (Powell, J., concurring), discussed in text accompanying notes 33-35 supra. In that case,
Justice Powell wrote that it was the role of the judiciary to review each litigation involving an
act of state issue on an individual basis to determine whether deference to the executive
branch required judicial absention. 406 U.S. at 774. However, Justice Powell noted in his
concurring opinion in Dunhill that he could foresee no reason to abstain "in cases involving
only commercial acts of a foreign state." 96 S. Ct. at 1871 (Powell, J., concurring.).
6096 S. Ct. at 1861. Justice Stevens found it unnecessary to reach the issue of a
commercial exception to the act of state doctrine. See id. at 1871 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part).
"I Id. at 1859.
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the funds mistakenly paid them .... -"2 This, the majority held,
had not been done. In the Court's view, the statement of Cuba's
counsel denying the interventors' liability and refusing to make
repayment
merely restated respondents' original legal position and add[ed]
little, if anything, to the proof of an act of state. No statute,
decree, order or resolution of the Cuban government itself was
offered in evidence indicating that Cuba had repudiated her obligations in general or any class thereof or that she had as a
sovereign matter determined
to confiscate the amounts due three
63
foreign importers.
Moreover, the majority entertained serious doubt as to
whether the interventors, who were merely agents appointed to
operate a business, pay its debts, and collect accounts receivable,
had the sovereign power necessary to repudiate debts incurred by
those businesses. The Court found no facts from which it could
conclude that the interventors had the authority to exercise such
64
sovereign power as was attributed to them by Cuba's counsel.
In considering what was perhaps the most far-reaching issue
of the Dunhill case, Justices White, Rehnquist, Powell, and the
Chief Justice recognized the existence of a commercial exception to
the act of state doctrine. The four Justices also determined that the
Dunhill case fit squarely within that exception.6 5 Justice White's
analysis of the commercial exception to the act of state doctrine
substantially paralleled the reasoning advanced by both Dunhill
and the Solicitor General. 66 The Supreme Court adopted the premise that a state engaging in commerce does so as a trader, and not
as a sovereign. Justice White wrote:
Repudiation of a commercial debt cannot, consistent with [the]
restrictive approach to sovereign immunity, be treated as an act
of state; for if it were, foreign governments, by merely repudiating the debt before or after its adjudication, would enjoy an
62

Id.
1 d. at 1861.
Id. at 1860. Justice White wrote:
I4
[I]n addition to authority to operate commercial businesses, to pay their bills and to
collect their accounts receivable, interventors [have not been shown to be] invested
with sovereign authority to repudiate all or any part of the debts incurred by those
businesses. 1rndeed, it is difficult to believe that they had the power selectively to
refuse payment of legitimate debts arising from the operation of those commercial
enterprises.
63

Id.

65

1d. at 1861-67.
Compare id., with Brief for Petitioner on Reargument at 8-18, and Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 27-43. See text accompanying notes 40-53 supra.
61 96 S. Ct. at 1863.
66
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immunity which our government would not extend them under
prevailing sovereign immunity principles in this country. This
would undermine the policy supporting the restrictive view of
immunity, which is to assure those engaging in commercial
transactions with foreign sovereignties that their
rights will be
68
determined in the courts whenever possible.

Justice White observed that the restrictive approach to sovereign immunity followed in the United States 69 is based on several
factors: First, such an approach has been accepted "by a large and
increasing number of foreign states in the international community";7 0 second, the United States itself has consented to be sued in
matters regarding its own merchant vessels; 7 ' and, third, foreign
sovereigns have become so involved in international trade as to
render it essential for "persons doing business with them to have
their rights determined in the courts. ' 72 Serious harm might ensue
if a sovereign could effectively gain the benefits of absolute
sovereign immunity while acting in the commercial sphere.7 3 Since
Cuba's act of state, if any, was a repudiation of a purely commercial
obligation, it was not, under Justice White's analysis, entitled to be
74
accorded the deference due a noncommercial act of state.
Justice Marshall authored a dissenting opinion which was con68

Id.

"' See notes 42-46 and accompanying text supra. Legislation to codify the restrictive

theory of sovereign immunity which had been pending at the time of the Dunhill litigation
has recently been enacted. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583 (Oct. 21,
1976).
70 96 S. Ct. at 1865. The "Tate Letter," 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952), quoted in Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 96 S. Ct. 1854, 1869-71 (1976), which first
espoused the restrictive sovereign immunity theory in this country, noted that there was little
support for an unrestricted theory of sovereign immunity outside of the Soviet Union. The
opinion in Dunhill cited over a dozen decisions in as many countries which, over the last 3
decades, have adhered to the restrictive sovereign immunity approach. 96 S. Ct. at 1865
n.15.
7 96 S. Ct. at 1865.
72 d. Justice White emphasized that exposure of foreign sovereigns to the courts
in the context of their commercial obligations does not create a grave risk of affronting
foreign governments. Id. This was a concern deemed essential by the Court in Sabbatino. See
376 U.S. at 431. In addition, Justice White noted that in the area of commerce, settled rules
of international law have emerged which are readily applicable to the commercial dealings of
sovereigns:
There may be little codification or consensus as to the rules of international law
concerning exercises of governmental powers, including military powers and expropriations, within a sovereign state's borders affecting the property or persons of
aliens. However, more discernible rules of international law have emerged with
regard to the commercial dealings of private parties in the international market.
The restrictive approach to sovereign immunity suggests that these established rules
should be applied to the commercial transactions of sovereign states.
96 S. Ct. at 1866 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
73 96 S. Ct. at 1865.
74
1d. at 1866-67.
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curred in by Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun. 75 It was the
opinion of the dissenters that the record revealed the existence of
an act of state. Justice Marshall declared:
The act of state doctrine commits the courts of this country not
to sit in judgment of the acts of a foreign government performed
within its own territory. Under any realistic view of the facts of
this case, the interventors' retention of and refusal to return
funds paid to them by Dunhill constitute an act of state, and no
affirmative
recovery by Dunhill can rest on the invalidity of that
76
conduct.

The remarks of counsel for Cuba were viewed by the dissent as
"authoritative representations of the position of counsel's clients"
and as such served "to confirm that the continued retention of
those monies has been undertaken as an exercise of sovereign
power.

77

The dissent declined to reach the broader question of a commercial exception to the act of state doctrine, arguing that even if
such an exception should exist, it was not available under the facts
of Dunhill.7 a This position was predicated upon the view that Cuba's retention of the preintervention payments was in accordance
79
with the original Decree and was not a "purely commercial" act.
Justice Marshall stated:
Cuba's . . .refusal to repay the funds at issue in this case took
place against the background of the intervention ... pursuant to

the initial intervention decree. For all practical purposes, the seizure of the funds once they arrived in Cuba [was] indistinguishable from the seizure
of the remainder of the cigar manufac80
turer's businesses.

Accordingly, the dissent maintained that the affirmative judgment
in favor of Dunhill was properly vacated by the court of appeals.8 1
FORMULATING A COMMERCIAL EXCEPTION

It is the thesis of this Article that there should, indeed, be a
commercial exception to the act of state doctrine, and that cases of
exceptional gravity will arise which will turn upon this exception
and its ramifications. Moreover, a careful analysis of Dunhill - a
75
76

d. at 1871 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1d. (footnote omitted).
77Id. at 1875 (footnote omitted).
78
Id.

79
1d.
80

at 1878.
Id.
81
Id. at 1882.
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case which probably did not present the best possible factual setting
for the development of a commercial exception - reveals that
while at least four Justices fully accepted the commercial thesis, the
remainder of the Court did not necessarily reject it. Indeed, it is
submitted that the sharp split in the Court may not have resulted
from doctrinal differences. Rather, alternative arguments made in
the presentation of Cuba's case in the course of the litigation may
have caused the Justices to perceive the facts differently.
On the one hand, statements of Cuba's counsel at trial could be
read as supporting the argument that an act of state occurred when
the monies paid by the importers for preintervention shipments
were retained upon arrival in Cuba pursuant to the intervention
Decree.8 2 On the other hand, in its trial brief Cuba argued that it
had not retained the funds pursuant to the Decree. Rather, it was
contended that an independent act of state occurred when Cuba
repudiated its obligation to return the importers' mistakenly submitted payments.8 3 Although this latter argument was rejected by
of
the trial court,8 4 the Second Circuit held that Cuba's repudiation
85
its obligation to the importers was, in fact, an act of state.
At the time Dunhill filed its petition for certiorari, a series of
events unrelated to the Dunhill controversy had occurred which
vastly increased Cuba's interest in securing affirmance of the Second Circuit's disposition. These events had their genesis in 1961
when a Cuban branch of an American bank was nationalized by a
decree which also apparently provided for the assumption of all
banking obligations. On the strength of this assumption of liability,
the American parent honored letters of credit issued by the Cuban
branch. When th nationalized branch bank refused to reimburse
the American parent, an action was instituted in Bank of Boston v.
Counsel for Cuba had stated at the trial of the Menendez action:
[U]nder the act of state doctrine the Cuban government, in accepting, appropriating, seizing, nationalizing, whatever other words you want, to take this money, has
done so pursuant to a regulation, a law, a decree of the government of Cuba, and
therefore the courts of this state will not look into the matter nor will the federal
court.
Now, I am not talking about the extraterritorial effect of an act of state. I am
talking about a territorial effect, namely, the seizure or the acceptance or the appropriation of this money when it got down to Cuba. We are not now concerned
with whether they expropriated debts on September 15th. The question is what
happened on October Ist, and October 15th and on November 8th and December
12th, when the money came down. And at that time the Cuban government took
this money and under the act of state doctrine it belongs to the Cuban government.
Record at 854-56, quoted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 96 S. Ct.
1854, 1874 (1976).
83 Answering Brief for Plaintiff-Interventors at 20-22.
82

345 F. Supp. at 545; see text accompanying note 29 supra.
5 485 F.2d at 1371; see text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
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Banco Nacional de Cuba 86 for $1.6 million, an amount which
dwarfed the amount at stake in the Dunhill controversy. Relying on
the holding of the court of appeals in Dunhill, Banco Nacional
contended in Bank of Boston that its repudiation of the obligations it
had incurred by the nationalization Decree constituted an act of
state.8 7 Against the backdrop of these events, Cuba opposed
Dunhill's petition for certiorari, arguing as it did in Bank of Boston
that the interventors' repudiation of their obligation constituted an
act of state:
[H]ere, the Republic of Cuba is a party to the suit. For seven long
years it has been asserting that its repudiation of the debt was its
act of state. That assertion was made in the district court, in the
court of appeals and is now being made in this Court. It has been
and is being made by counsel ....

88

Clearly, Cuba's interest in obtaining Supreme Court approval
of this act of state argument was intensified by the comparatively
large amount in controversy in the Bank of Boston litigation. However, when the Supreme Court directed the parties to the Dunhill
litigation to discuss the advisability of reconsidering the Sabbatino
doctrine,8 9 Cuba was faced with an issue of such importance as to
render insignificant the amounts disputed in both the Dunhill and
Bank of Boston cases. Accordingly, on reargument Cuba seemingly
abandoned its efforts to secure affirmance of the Second Circuit's
characterization of Cuba's repudiation as an act of state. Instead,
Cuba claimed the preintervention payments on the basis of a more
"typical" act of state, retention of the monies pursuant to the intervention Decree:
86 Civil No. 61-2116 (S.D.N.Y., filed June 15, 1961).
87 A trial had already been held in the Bank of Boston litigation when the court of appeals
decision in Dunhill was rendered. The Bank of Boston trial judge called for supplemental
briefs discussing the applicability of the Dunhill decision to the case at bar. To date, no
decision has been rendered in the Bank of Boston case.
88 Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 3. In its petition for certiorari,
Dunhill discussed the Bank of Boston case, noting that it "emphasize[d] the uncertainty which
will be created if the Court of Appeals decision is left unreviewed." Petitioner's Brief for
Certiorari at 10. In addition, Dunhill argued:
The implications of the holding of the Court of Appeals are far-reaching. If that
holding is followed, any dispute arising out of a commercial transaction with a
foreign government can be immunized from full judicial review in the courts of the
United States. A simple statement by counsel for the foreign government will be
sufficient to trigger the Act of State doctrine and thus divest our courts of the
power to resolve the controversy against the foreign government. We are entering
an era marked by a vast increase in commercial dealings between United States
nationals and foreign governments - often involving transactions of massive proportions. Under the holding of the Court of Appeals, in disputes arising out of such
transactions, our courts will always be available to grant relief against the American
national, but, with a word from opposing counsel, never in his favor.
Id. at 9.
89 422 U.S. 1005 (1975). See text accompanying note 39 supra.
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[Cuba] is seeking.., to hold on to an asset located in Cuba - an
asset it claims on the basis of a typical act of state, its original
intervention decree.
We do not agree that the act of state doctrine does not apply to
commercial transactions but find no need to argue the point
here. It is, of course, absurd to characterize this as an ordinary
commercial controversy. It arose, not out of normal international
trade, but out of an intervention and it is the intervention which
is the act of state, not the repudiation of a commercial debt. 90
The Court, however, refused to disturb the conclusion of the
Second Circuit that the interventors had acquired the preintervention accounts not by retention pursuant to the Decree, but rather by
repudiation of the obligation to repay. Thus their inquiry was limited to whether the repudiation alone constituted an act of state. 9 1
Viewing Cuba's repudiation as a "purely commercial" act,9 2 the
four Justices concluded that there had transpired no act of state
and that had there been such an act, its "purely commercial"
character excepted it from the act of state doctrine. 93
The dissent, on the other hand, did not limit itself to the
Second Circuit's delineation of the act of state issue. The dissent
substantially adopted the argument advanced by Cuba on reargument before the Supreme Court, and declared that an act of state
occurred when Cuba retained the funds in Cuba pursuant to the
intervention Decree. 94 Thus, in the eyes of the dissenters, the relevant act of state was entirely noncommercial in character since it
was no more than an aspect of the expropriation Decree. 95 Accordingly, the dissent concluded that any possible commercial exception
to the act of state doctrine would be inapplicable to the Dunhill
case.

96

It is the belief of the authors that a commercial exception to
the act of state doctrine will be sanctioned by the Supreme Court
when there emerges a case unencumbered by the factual disputes
in Dunhill. This commercial exception is based upon the theory that
a governmental body which enters the commercial arena should
not be permitted to enjoy without limitation the privileges of
sovereignty in its commercial dealings. That is, a government may
not assert its sovereign status as a blanket protection against liability
incurred while acting as a trader.
90 Brief for Respondent on Reargument at 4, 8 (footnote omitted).
91 96 S. Ct. 1854, 1859, 1860 n.8 (1976).
92Id. at 1861.

9Id.

94Id. at 1874 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
9"Id. at 1878.
961d
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Difficult questions about the scope of this commercial exception may emerge in cases where a nation repudiates a commercial
obligation while acting in a dual role as both a sovereign and a
commercial entity. Such questions were not reached in Dunhill since
Justice White and the concurring Justices viewed Cuba's repudiation of its obligation as no more than a refusal to repay monies
received in the course of commercial transactions, 9 7 while the dissent treated the repudiation as a logical extension of the intervention Decree and thus wholly unrelated to any commercial activities
of the Government of Cuba. 98
Cases may arise, however, wherein a nation's repudiation of its
commercial obligations takes a form suggestive of a sovereign act.
Consider, for example, an embargo imposed by a nation suffering
a shortage of goods which has the effect of abrogating that nation's
commitments to deliver contracted-for commodities. Or, consider a
nation which, faced with a ruinous balance of payments situation,
places a total ban on imports payable in foreign currency and, in so
doing, makes unlawful the honoring of its own purchase contracts.
Such cases, it is suggested, will require slightly different analysis
than cases involving a nation's mere repudiation of a commercial
obligation.
For example, in Dunhill, which in the opinion of the authors
and at least four Justices of the Supreme Court involved a simple
repudiation of an obligation to repay monies mistakenly received in
commerce, 99 it is submitted that such a repudiation should not be
viewed as an act of state. Rather, it should be viewed as an act of a
commercial entity which, wholly immaterially, happened to be a
government agency. Under this analysis, it would be imprecise to
describe judicial scrutiny of a nation's wholly commercial acts as
permissible under an "exception" to the deferential act of state
doctrine. More accurately, the acts of a foreign sovereign functioning as a purely commercial entity should be subject to examination
by the courts simply because such acts are not true acts of state.
It would be a fiction of the first order, however, to characterize a
nation's embargoes, import bans, or currency trading restrictions as
"purely" commercial acts of a commercial entity. Regardless of a
nation's status as a trader and the effect of such embargoes and the
like on its trading commitments, those acts are performed by a
nation which has assumed a dual role as both a sovereign and a
9'See id.at 1861.
9'See id.at 1878 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99See id.at 1861.
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commercial entity. If full recognition is to be denied such acts by the
courts of the United States, there must be created a true exception to
the act of state doctrine.
It is submitted that there should exist such a true commercial
exception permitting the courts of this country to adjudicate any
dispute arising out of a nation's commercial dealings. A foreign
government should succeed in escaping its commercial obligations
by means of an act clearly sovereign in nature, only when it can be
demonstrated that the sovereign's act is lawful under recognized
principles of international law.1 00 Clearly, the adoption of a true
commercial exception rule would require that Sabbatino be partially
overruled since such a rule would mandate judicial examination of
the propriety of sovereign acts under standards of international law.
But, it is the opinion of the authors that entry into the world
marketplace by a sovereign requires such a result. A sovereign which
engages in an international commercial transaction should be
deemed to have agreed implicitly to abide by the well-established
rules of international law governing such dealings.' 0 ' It seems
hardly unreasonable, therefore, to insist that a sovereign which
seeks treatment qua sovereign to justify repudiation of its commercial obligations abide by the rules of international law governing the
conduct of nations.
It should be noted, moreover, that the sensitive problems of
international relations which intensified the Sabbatino Court's desire
to avoid consideration of the vexing questions of international law
presented in that case,' do not preclude a true commercial exception to the act of state doctrine. The Sabbatino case, it should be
remembered, involved Cuban expropriation of the property of a
Cuban corporation which was substantially owned by United States
residents. The Sabbatino Court observed:
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification
or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the
more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the application of an
agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national interest or with international justice. It is also evident that
some aspects of international law touch much more sharply on
national nerves than do others ....
There are few if any issues in international law today on
100 Justice White commented upon the feasibility of applying rules of international law
to sovereigns acting in commercial capacities. See id. at 1866; note 72 supra.
"'1 See note 72 supra.
102
See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 431-34 (1964); note 6supra.
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which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state's
power to expropriate the property of aliens. 10 3
In contrast, the issues likely involved when a nation acts in a dual
sovereign-commercial capacity - the lawfulness of curtency restricnot notably sensitive istions, 1 0 4 embargoes, 10 and the like -are
sues upon which conflicting ideological systems would likely reach
differing conclusions. Since international consensus on the resolution of issues raised by such sovereign-commercial acts of nations is
not unlikely, adjudication of such issues creates little chance of
disturbing foreign affairs.
Additionally, it is the opinion of the authors that even a sovereign-commercial act which is facially in accordance with international law should be subject to judicial scrutiny to determine if it is
merely a subterfuge to avoid commercial obligations. Though such
an inquiry may seem inordinately delicate, courts of this country
have demonstrated willingness to engage in similarly vexing inquiries. In United States v. Sisal Sales Corp. ,06 a number of organizations faced charges of antitrust violations arising from the formation of a cartel of Mexican sisal producers whose products were
purchased by an exclusive American importer. Establishment of
the cartel was greatly aided by favorable Mexican legislation which
was solicited and secured by the Sisal Sales defendants. 7 It was
contended by the defendants that the alleged monopoly was
created by the laws of a foreign state and thus could not be
complained of in American courts.1 08 The Supreme Court held
that the defendants could be enjoined from violating the antitrust
laws since the defendants had entered into a conspiracy to
monopolize the sisal business within the United States and had
themselves procured the Mexican legislation:
The United States complain of a violation of their laws within
their own territory by parties subject to their jurisdiction, not
merel of something done by another government at the instigation ot private parties. True, the conspirators were aided by
discriminating legislation, but by their own deliberate acts, here
and elsewhere, they brought about forbidden results within the
United States. They are within the jurisdiction of our courts and
may be punished for offenses against our laws. 10 9
376 U.S. at 428 (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., M. SCHUSTER, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
1 5 Cf. K. VON SCHUSCHNIGG, INTERNATIONAL LAw: AN
PEACE 303 (1959).
106 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
07 Id. at 273-74.
1100 Id. at 270, 275-76.
91d. at 276.
103

104
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Similarly, in Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo,
the defendants, oil suppliers, had engaged in a boycott
designed to deny the plaintiff, a refiner of Venezuelan crude oil,
the oil required for its operations. The defendants raised as a
defense the fact that they were compelled by regulatory authorities
in Venezuela to engage in such a boycott."' The court held that
compulsion by a foreign sovereign is a complete defense to an
antitrust action brought against a private party, and stated:

Inc.,1 °

Nothing in the materials before the Court indicates that defendants either procured the Venezuelan order or that they acted
voluntarily pursuant to a delegation of authority to control the
oil industry. The narrow question for decision is the availability
1 2
of genuine compulsion by a foreign sovereign as a defense.
Thus, in both Sisal Sales and InteramericanRefining the courts
did not hesitate to sanction judicial inquiry into the question of
whether the acts of a foreign government were procured by private
parties. If the courts are willing to scrutinize the good faith of the
acts of foreign governments which are claimed to justify the behavior of nongovernmental entities, they should similarly be willing
to examine the acts of a sovereign which affect its nongovernmental commercial transactions.
Finally, it is submitted that the true commercial exception suggested here is in. accord with the fundamental principle applicable
in resolving disputes between parties to commercial transactions:
honoring the intent of the parties. The underlying expectation of
the parties to any commercial agreement is that each will perform
its obligations, subject only to contingencies beyond its control. The
scope of those contingencies is usually spelled out in the form of a
force majeure clause or by reference to a body of law or arbitration
rules which embody appropriate principles to be applied to "acts of
God" or "acts of princes" which may hinder performance totally or
partially. 1 3 Where, however, one party to a commercial transaction
110 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
"'Id.
at 1294.
112 d. at 1297 (footnote omitted).
113 The concept that supervening events beyond the control of the parties will, under
appropriate circumstances, excuse performance is embodied in some form in the law of all
commercial nations. The term force majeure - which refers to an insurmountable force
rendering performance impossible - is derived from articles 1147 and 1148 of the
Napoleonic [Civil] Code of 1804. See A. VON MEHREN, CIVIL LAw 862 (1957); M. PLANIOL &
G. RIPERT, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAw (lth ed. 1939). Under German law, performance
can be excused if the set of basic assumptions surrounding the transaction, the "Geschaftsgrundlage," has "disappeared or [become] fundamentally altered" such that "enforcement by one party of the original contract would offend against Treu und Glauben [good
faith]." Cartwright, The Law of Obligations in England and Germany: Comparative Reflections in
the Light of the Proposalsin Law Rform Now, 13 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 1316, 1335 (1964); see
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is a governmental entity, an inherent conflict exists between certain
.recognized excuses for nonperformance, i.e. governmental acts,
and the traditional justification for allowing such an excuse, i.e. that
the event is beyond the control of the party seeking to invoke it.
Under the rule suggested here, a governmental trading agency
would remain free to negotiate terms in its contracts specifying the
kinds of subsequent behavior by its government, not clearly interdicted by international law, which would excuse nonperformance.
At the same time, the governmental agency would be subject to the
rules so specified when seeking to rely on its own unlawful acts or
acts within its control which have the effect of thwarting its own
performance. Moreover, the existence of a well-recognized commercial exception to the act of state doctrine might force governmental agencies and their private trading partners to focus
more carefully during the contracting stage on precisely which acts
by the foreign sovereign will constitute an appropriate excuse for
Smit, Frustration of Contract: A Comparative Attempt at Consolidation, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 287,
297 (1958). The German approach is paralleled at least in Switzerland, Turkey, and Greece,
see Hay, Frustration and Its Solution in German Law, 10 AM. J. COMP. L. 345, 353-55 (1961);
Zepos, Frustration of Contract in Comparative Law and in the New Greek Civil Code of 1946, 11
MODERN L. REv. 36, 41-42 (1948), and also by countries such as Belgium, Israel, Italy, and
The Netherlands, which have ratified without reservation the treaty known as the Uniform
Law on the International Sale of Goods, as appearingin 30 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 131 (1971). The laws of Romania, Lebanon, Austria, the Soviet Union, and the law of
Belgium and The Netherlands as it existed prior to ratification of the Uniform Law of
International Sales probably developed along the lines of the French concept of force
majeure. See Hay, Frustrationand Its Solution in German Law, 10 AM. J. COMP. L. 345, 352 &
n.35 (1961); Note, Colloquium on Some Problems of Non-Performance and Force Majeure in International Contracts of Sale, 9 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 677, 680 (1960). Although there are few
decided cases, Japanese law recognizes the principle of change of circumstances ('j5henk6
no gensoku"), see KATsOMOTO, MIMP 6 Ni OKERU JIJ 6 HENK 6 N GENSOKU (Change of Circumstances Theory in Civil Law) (1926), cited in Igarashi & Rieke, Impossibility and Frustration in
Sales Contracts, 42 WASH. L. REv. 445, 452 (1967), and in Latin American jurisprudence the
doctrine of frustration exists to deal with unforeseeable events. See, e.g., Hay, Frustrationand
Its Solution in German Law, 10 AM. J. COMP. L. 345 (1961); Drachsler, Frustrationof Contract:
Comparative Law Aspects of Remedies in Cases of Supervening Illegality, 3 N.Y.L.F. 50, 79-80
(1957).
The common law counterparts to the civil law doctrine of force majeure and change of
circumstances are the fraternal doctrines of impossibility of performance, in American terminology, and frustration of contract in British jurisprudence. The once inflexible pacta sunt
servanda doctrine of Paradine v. Jane, [1647] Aleyn 26, has been modified by numerous cases
which set forth the doctrine of frustration of contract, although they often evidence a
judicial reluctance to resort to the doctrine. See, e.g., Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham
Urban District Council, [1956] A.C. 696; British Movietonews Ltd. v. London and District
Cinemas Ltd., [1952] A.C. 166 (1951). In the United States, § 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code deals at length with "Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions" and
excuses performance in sales contracts where it "has become commercially impracticable
because of unforeseen supervening circumstances not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contract." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 1. Accepted by
at least one federal circuit as a "source for the 'federal' law of sales," United States v.
Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.), § 2-615 has been recognized by still another circuit as reflecting contemporary concepts of impossibility. Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Wright, J.).
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the governmental agency's nonperformance. To this extent, the
commercial exception will serve to clarify further the intent of the
parties and to reduce the element of uncertainty in such transactions.
Under the views expressed above, the sovereign which enters
into international commercial agreements will not be permitted to
avoid judicial scrutiny of its own public acts which operate to negate its commercial obligations. Wartime embargoes, economic
emergency decrees, currency control regulations, and the like, if
valid under international law and not invoked solely as devices to
nullify commercial undertakings, should pass judicial scrutiny and
excuse a sovereign from its commercial obligations. Ultimately, it is
submitted that judicial scrutiny of commercial acts of sovereigns
will enhance the stability of international trade at a time when the
role of nations in the world marketplace is becoming ever more
important.

